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I.    INTRODUCTION 
A.  THE POST-COLD WAR FISCAL CRISIS 
The United States government is confronting a deepening 
crisis. It is currently caught between the need to provide 
basic services to an expectant public and a shortage of 
dollars to fund these services. Consequently, the search 
continues throughout all levels of government for remedies to 
this increasingly complex dilemma. 
The pattern of American military spending over the past 
50 years resembles a feast or famine cycle. Since the end of 
World War II, the defense budget has lacked consistency 
(Friedberg, 1991). The days of famine are upon the 
Department of Defense once again. It is to be hoped that 
Congress will break this cycle in military spending. The 
threats to national security are changing in shape but they 
nevertheless continue to exist. Future levels of defense 
spending must be high enough to permit a quick transition to 
a more active posture if required (Friedberg, 1991). 
The harsh economic realities of the 1990s have put 
government officials across the country in a bind: in the 
face of rising costs and declining revenues, the DoD is asked 
to maintain the scope and quality of services that voters 
expect. More must be done with less. Taxpayers are 
reluctant to approve tax increases, not only making it 
difficult to add new services but sometimes making it 
difficult to continue providing services at current levels 
(Rose, 1994). How is the government to operate more 
efficiently with less funds? 
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B.   OUTSOURCING REDISCOVERED 
A number of city, county, state, and even federal 
officials are turning to the private sector for at least part 
of the answer. They have allowed businesses of all sizes to 
take over many of the services formerly performed by civil 
servants and even some of the facilities traditionally built, 
owned and operated by governments.  (Holzinger, 1992) 
This process, is most commonly called privatization, a 
term coined by Peter F. Drucker, a management specialist, in 
his book The Age of Discontinuity.    Privatization or 
outsourcing! is the practice of delegating traditionally 
public duties to private organizations (Fitzgerald, 1988). 
1.  Reasons for the Trend 
Support for the outsourcing movement gathered momentum 
over the past ten years. -Government should spend more time 
governing and less time providing. Government should 
purchase services from the private sector or stop producing." 
(Fitzgerald, 1988) Studies have been conducted to compare 
private industry to its government agency counterpart and 
have found private industry to be more efficient. Based on 
these findings, the Department of Defense is looking to make 
use of any advantages outsourcing has to offer. 
A recognition of systemic failure to control debt at the 
Federal level has accelerated the need for change. An 
undercurrent away from reliance on traditional government 
approaches and a move toward a novel application of self-help 
and private sector strategies to deliver social need 
1 The terms "outsourcing" and "privatization" will be used interchangeably. 
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permeates government agencies. Former New York Governor 
Mario Cuomo stated, "It is not the government's obligation to 
provide services, but to see that the services are provided 
for." Government should not be a producer of services, but a 
skilled shopper locating producers that will accomplish goals 
set by government at least possible cost. (Fitzgerald, 1988) 
C.   AREA OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis investigates the practicality of adopting a 
vigorous outsourcing initiative within the Navy as the DoD 
attempts to meet the challenge maintaining readiness in the 
face of dwindling resources. 
1. Primary Question 
The primary question addressed in this thesis is: What 
has been the experience of a Navy command with outsourcing 
from a managerial perspective, what concerns have developed, 
and what conclusions can be drawn from this experience? 
2. Secondary Questions 
In answering the primary question, the following 
secondary questions will be addressed: 
1. What is the definition of outsourcing? 
2. What are the issues involved in outsourcing? 
3. What are the some of the major positive and 
negative aspects of outsourcing? 
4. What are some general lessons learned from 
outsourcing in other government agencies and do 
they reflect those experienced by the Navy? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will primarily focus on one component of the 
Navy, COMNAVAIRPAC, located in San Diego and will: 
1. report the outsourcing process followed by 
COMNAVAIRPAC; 
2. identify some concerns relative to outsourcing 
based on opinions of involved personnel; 
3. compare the experiences of COMNAVAIRPAC to that of 
other government agencies that have outsourced and; 
4. provide conclusions and recommendations regarding 
the effectiveness of outsourcing in the 
COMNAVAIRPAC case. 
Time does not permit this thesis to explore a cost 
comparison of a base operated utilizing in house resources 
with that same base contracted out. Further research in this 
area would be of extreme interest to the Navy and DoD as more 
and more outsourcing initiatives of this type are executed. 
E. METHODOLOG! 
A wide variety of references was used in the collection 
of data for this thesis to obtain historical information, 
current issues and facts. The methodology used to gather 
data entailed a thorough literature search and examination to 
acquire background information and the general theory behind 
outsourcing, and the use of the INFOTRAC resource to collect 
current views and opinions regarding the outsourcing, its 
effectiveness, advantages and disadvantages. 
Interviews with key personnel at COMNAVAIRPAC involved 
in the outsourcing process such as the the Comptroller, 
Budget Officer, and Shore Activities Activities personnel 
were conducted to provide expert opinions on the 
implementation and overall effectiveness of the outsourcing 
initiative. 
F.   BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will benefit the Navy and the DoD. With the 
increasing pressure on the military to efficiently manage 
limited resources, it becomes critical to make the DoD budget 
stretch further than it ever has before. Outsourcing has 
been viewed as a possible solution to meeting targeted 
budgets cuts while maintaining readiness of forces, quality 
of service, and cost effectiveness. 
This thesis will report how a Navy command is dealing 
with outsourcing issues as they attempt to comply with new 
DoD initiatives toward outsourcing. What occurs at 
COMNAVAIRPAC may be indicative of what is occurring at other 
commands throughout the Navy and DoD. Issues that are 
discussed and recommendations proposed within this thesis may 
assist decision makers in arriving at an informed decision 
either to outsource or to maintain a service in house. 
Follow-on research may provide clear financial 
advantages/disadvantages to maintaining production of a good 
or service in house or opting for the outsourcing 
alternative. 
6.  ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This section briefly describes the content organization 
of the remainder of the thesis. 
Chapter II (Background): Chapter II begins by 
describing the history of outsourcing and how the concept has 
regained support since the promulgation of OMB Circular A-76 
(Performance of Commercial Activities). Outsourcing is 
defined, and reasons for its resurgent popularity are 
examined. A discussion of the general advantages and 
disadvantages of outsourcing, and the identification of some 
distinctions between the public and private sectors concludes 
the chapter. 
Chapter III (Outsourcing in Practice): This chapter 
discusses the case of COMNAVAIRPAC. A background case of 
successful outsourcing (Mustang, Oklahoma) will be discussed 
and then background information on COMNAVAIRPAC to include 
mission, responsibilities, and resources is presented. A 
detailed description on COMNAVAIRPAC's current outsourcing 
posture follows along with their experience in the management 
of outsourcing and opinions of key personnel involved with 
the outsourcing process. 
Chapter IV (Analysis): The data presented in Chapter 
III is discussed and analyzed. Specific concerns regarding 
outsourcing are identified by COMNAVAIRPAC personnel. 
Chapter V (Conclusions and Recommendations): This last 
chapter discusses the possible ramifications of the 
outsourcing experiences of COMNAVAIRPAC and what 
implications these experiences may have for the rest of the 
Navy and DoD. Independent conclusions are drawn from the data 
gathered, and recommendations follow to end the chapter and 
thesis. 
A list of references and an extensive bibliography are 
included to assist readers in further readings on the topic. 
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II. BACKGROUND   OF  OUTSOURCING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In times of ever-shrinking budgets and uncertainty 
regarding service demand that the future may hold for the 
Department of Defense, outsourcing is being closely examined 
for use as a management tool to offset budget reductions. 
The concept is not new (Holcombe, 1991). The federal 
government officially recognized the advantages of 
privatization years ago in OMB Circular A-76, "Performance of 
Commercial Activities" (HASC 101-31, 1990). A-76 requires 
agencies to contract with the private sector whenever that 
option would cost taxpayers less than providing comparable 
goods and services with federal employees (Holzinger, 1992). 
The interest in privatization grew explosively in scope 
and intensity throughout the 1980s under the market-oriented 
administration of President Reagan as a way of more 
efficiently producing goods and services that were 
traditionally provided by the public sector (Holcombe, 1991). 
Longtime observers suggest that this interest is at an all- 
time high today, not only in this country but also throughout 
the world (Holzinger, 1992). Privatization's appeal is 
strong during a time when hard-pressed public officials 
search for ways to save money and provide services more 
efficiently (Morgan, 1992). 
B. OUTSOURCING DEFINED 
What is outsourcing? There are nearly as many ways to 
define it as there are people to give definitions. 
Privatization can be described as occurring when the 
government disengages from specific kinds of responsibility 
or deregulates entry into activities that were previously 
public monopolies. As defined by Webster, privatization is 
the process of changing from public to private control or 
ownership. 
At its broadest level, privatization involves the 
introduction of market forces into an economy, the shifting 
of government goods or services into the private sector 
(Nuskey, 1992). E. S. Savas describes it as more reliance on 
private sector institutions and less on the government to 
satisfy social needs (Fitzgerald, 1988). 
The Grace Commission maintained that privatization is 
"to provide services without producing them." (Kettl, 1988) 
For the purposes of this thesis, it shall be defined as 
government simply choosing to delegate a particular service 
to the private sector as opposed to continuing to perform 
that task with in house personnel or resources. 
Privatization carries with it many connotations. 
Ideally, it involves transferring as many programs as 
possible to the private sector where the pressures of 
competition will improve efficiency. Those programs 
remaining would rely more on the private sector with its 
superior incentives to administer them. The government would 
be left to make basic decisions but the private sector, to 
the extent possible, would implement the directed course of 
action (Kettl, 1988). Outsourcing does not entail utter 
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abandonment of federal responsibility to private enterprise, 
it merely denotes a shifting of performance vice 
responsibility for services rendered. 
Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations   concluded that, "no 
two characters seem more inconsistent that those of trader 
and sovereign." (Hanke, 1987) In other words, the business 
of government is not to be in business for profit. 
In an effort to open up traditionally government 
provided services to the private sector, OMB circular A-76, 
"Performance of Commercial Activities," established a 
government-wide policy that government should obtain 
commercial services in the most cost-effective manner 
possible. Agencies are required to determine if it is more 
economical to retain the work in house or contract out to the 
private sector (HASC 101-31, 1990). 
Whenever the private sector can perform a given service 
or task at a lower cost than the Government it should be 
given the task. (Hanke, 1987) The intentions of A-76 were to 
generate competition, not merely force the contracting out of 
jobs (HASC 99-46, 1986). Privatization is a general effort 
to relieve the disincentives toward efficiency in a public 
organization by subjecting them to the incentives of the 
private market (Hanke, 1987). 
C.   REASONS FOR THE POPULARITY OF OUTSOURCING 
As previously mentioned, outsourcing is not a new idea, 
so what accounts for the resurgence in popularity of this 
concept? There are three major reasons: (1) The growing 
cost-revenue squeeze on the government; (2) public 
disillusionment with government programs and; (3) the 
magnitude of the federal deficit. 
1.  Growing Cost-revenue Squeeze 
The growing cost-revenue squeeze on the government is 
forcing agencies to reassess the way they do business. 
Competition for scarce monetary resources motivates managers 
to conduct operations in the most economically efficient way 
possible while maintaining established quality standards. 
Within a large agency such as the Defense Department, if 
it is determined that requirements can be met by performance 
of either government or a private organization, a cost 
comparison is conducted to determine the most economical 
method of operation. In many cases, the private organization 
appears superior (Nuskey, 1992). The increased efficiency, 
competition, improved quality and innovation all point to the 
flexibility, responsiveness and cost effectiveness of 
privatization. 
2.  Increased Public Disillusionment 
The American public has become increasingly 
disillusioned with government programs. The intellectual 
climate of the American people supports a turn away from 
government programs and toward private enterprise. A less 
naive view of the administration of such programs has colored 
the opinions of the people, who are beginning to lose faith 
with Uncle Sam to provide basic services and look to the 
entrepreneurs among society to take up the slack. 
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3.  The Magnitude of the Federal Deficit 
The magnitude of the federal deficit has also served to 
influence the trend toward outsourcing (Fitzgerald, 1988). 
The promise of reduction of public outlays, taxes, and 
borrowing requirements is great incentive to look outside the 
government and to the private sector. The government's 
fiscal condition has been widely reported and analyzed. The 
budget deficit continues to rise and with it , the federal 
debt. Servicing the debt costs taxpayers approximately $200 
billion annually, it can therefore arguably be said that the 
government is facing a fiscal crisis not experienced since 
the Great Depression (CBO, 1982). 
D.   BENEFITS OF OUTSOURCING 
A number of benefits of outsourcing are most often cited 
by proponents of the concept. Firstly, by contracting out a 
government provided service to the private sector, the 
government is released from the day-to-day operations 
(Mangravite and Moffitt, 1993) and relegated to providing 
oversight and is subsequently able to devote greater effort 
toward long-term goals and other priorities. 
Secondly, the injection of competition into an 
environment previously insulated from market influences 
inspires greater efficiency and improved quality in the 
performance of traditionally government performed tasks 
(Nuskey, 1992). 
Thirdly, the economic benefits of contracting with a 
private firm proficient in performing a service provided by 
the government can be significant, resulting in major cost 
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savings. Additionally, the private firm may have greater 
incentive to provide high quality service at lower cost than 
does a government agency (Kettl, 1988). Profit is a very 
strong motivator. 
1. Reduced Role of Government 
Proponents of outsourcing see a zero-sum relationship 
between government and the economy. The larger the public 
sector, the smaller the private economy. The more public 
spending, the less private savings and investment, 
productivity and growth (Hanke, 1987). Additionally, a 
transfer of jobs to the public sector will provided 
entrepreneurial and business expansion opportunities and 
subsequently enhance commercial environment (Holzinger, 
1992). The results hoped for include reduced government 
intervention and spending, falling unemployment, and business 
and investment opportunities (Nuskey, 1992). 
2. Competition 
One of the principal attractions of outsourcing is the 
use of competition to control costs and improving the 
delivery of services. "Competition and profit incentives are 
far stronger efficiency tools than any bureaucratic 
management ploy except perhaps death that any government has 
ever devised." (Fitzgerald, 1988) 
Many proponents of outsourcing conclude that wider 
competition will follow on the heels of private contractor 
entry into the realm of public services (Nuskey, 1992), and 
that particular service, previously performed by a government 
agency and therefore insulated from the market, becomes 
12 
subjected to normal market forces. Private firms, spurred on 
by competition, will presumably operate as efficiently as 
possible to increase their return on investment and 
ultimately will save taxpayer money. 
Outsourcing offers the government a way to take 
advantage of the increased efficiency of private sector 
production in providing services traditionally received 
through the public sector, and allows the government to reap 
the rewards of efficient service at a competitive price. In 
Savas's words, "Service delivery options are essential. 
Total dependence on a single supplier, whether government 
agency or private firm, is dangerous." (Morgan, 1992) 
Healthy competition among private firms and even among in 
house and private entities to perform a service, often 
results in improved quality at lower costs for the government 
(HASC 101-31, 1990). 
3.  Economic Efficiency and Incentives 
Supporters of outsourcing believe that whether 
outsourcing is followed by increases competition, it will 
promote economic efficiency. Outsourcing improves 
productivity and reduces waste by providing better incentives 
for the management of enterprise (Nuskey, 1992). Also, 
contractors are often able to take advantages of economies of 
scale unavailable to the government that can result in 
significant cost savings (Prager, 1994). 
By allowing firms to bid for the right to a 
privatization contract, competitive terms can be agreed to 
ahead of time and the firm that exchanges a service for an 
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agreed upon fee has incentive to produce the service 
efficiently, and would bear the cost of inefficient 
production - not the government (Holcombe, 1991). 
It is typically assumed that private facilities operate 
more efficiently than the government in performing commercial 
activities because a contractor has incentive to consider 
lifecycle costs. Making a profit is the primary goal of the 
private firm, and a contractor that exchanges services for a 
fee has incentive to produce efficiently. A private supplier 
will be more likely to minimize costs, for the cost-savings 
accrue to the firm owners and perhaps indirectly, the workers 
themselves. That cannot be presumed for the public sector as 
cost-savings do not accrue to public servants (Prager, 1994). 
The assumption that public sector production is 
inherently less efficient than the private sector rests upon 
the absence of the profit motive in government activities 
(Prager, 1994). Productivity rates are higher among private 
sector employees due to the profit motive - they have 
incentive to seek innovative ways to reduce costs. Little or 
no such incentive exists in the government (Hanke, 1987). 
Public employees perceive that they have no direct 
impact on the commercial outcome of their actions. The 
"reward" for efficiency in governmental programs is a funding 
cut in the next fiscal year. Many are the advantages of 
having a profit-making firm engage in production vice the 
government, with no profits to motivate innovation or 
efficiency (Holcombe, 1991). 
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a.  Differences   in   Private   and   Public   Sectors 
In order to gain further insight into the 
outsourcing process, it may be helpful to identify some of 
fundamental differences in the public and private sectors 
before proceeding further. When public and privates sectors 
are compared, the government: 
1. faces more complex and ambiguous tasks 
2. has more difficulty implementing decisions 
3. employs people with different motivation 
4. engages in activities with greater symbolic 
significance 
5. is held to stricter standards of commitment 
and legality 
6. has greater responsibility to issues of 
fairness 
7. must operate or appear to operate in the 
public interest 
8. must maintain some minimal level of public 
support above that required by private 
industry (Hanke, 1987) 
The flexibility of government authorities vis-a-vis 
contractors is more constrained than that of the private 
sector firm. This has direct impact on the outsourcing 
process. Transparency and fairness are high priorities of 
good government, but basically irrelevant in inter-firm 
relations. Hence the public sector bidding process must be 
structured to assure access to all potential bidders (e.g. 
adequate time, sealed bids, etc.). Moreover, the contract 
award must be perceived by all as fair; legal steps can be 
initiated if the rules are not adhered to precisely. 
(Prager, 1994) 
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The private firm may be more free to diverge from 
its announced procedures. Public authorities not only often 
face a more complex and costly bidding process but also a 
more time-consuming one. Anecdotal evidence points to 
extensive delays in project initiation merely because a 
losing contractor had tied up the government in court. 
(Prager, 1994) 
Outsourcing can be an effective tool in the hands 
of the DoD. There are however, constraints on the government 
be they tangible or intangible that affect the way business 
is conducted in the public environment. Ultimately, whether 
a service is kept in house or outsourced, the government is 
responsible for the quality of that service in the eyes of 
the public. The above distinctions between government and 
the private sector are important, and as such, should be 
taken into account during the decision making process prior 
to committing to an outsourcing project. 
E.   OUTSOURCING CONCERNS 
In contemplating a decision to outsource, advantages as 
well as disadvantages must be considered. There are a number 
of potential drawbacks to outsourcing but the following items 
are the most significant: (1) lack of experienced contract 
negotiators for the government; (2) the potential for 
contractor corruption; and (3) lack of competition among 
contractors. 
1.  Lack of Experienced Contract Administrators 
Care must be taken to set up an agreement between the 
government and the contractor that contains incentives for 
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efficiency. The agreement must be structured so both parties 
can benefit from any advantages that arise. 
Creating a contract that is beneficial to the government 
is not easy. Contractors have incentive to maximize profits, 
and it is not hard to imagine that a firm could produce a 
contract profitable enough that excess profits going to the 
firm greater than any bureaucratic waste generated if the 
government handled the production itself. (Holcombe, 1991) 
The cloud looming over outsourcing is that the profit 
maximizing private firm is dealing with a government that may 
have few incentives to act efficiently and, even if it does 
desire to do so, it may lack the expertise to design a 
favorable contract with a private sector firm (Holcombe, 
1991). If the private firm is allowed to pass major costs on 
to the government, any advantage that the government might 
have gained by outsourcing is removed. The firm has less 
incentive to be efficient and coupled with bargaining 
advantages, may leave the government paying more than if it 
did the service itself. (Holcombe, 1991) 
Potential efficiency gains from outsourcing benefit the 
government only if government is able to write effective 
contracts that allow gains to be produced and the government 
share in them. Private firms are more likely to have the 
greater bargaining power in drafting these agreements. They 
enter negotiations as experts, while military negotiators and 
their civilian assistants may have less information and 
little experience with outsourcing. Add the profit motive 
and the firm will have the government backed into a corner 
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completely oblivious to its condition until the bills begin 
arriving. The cost to the military of efficient private 
sector production under an unfavorable outsourcing agreement 
could exceed the cost of less efficient producing the service 
by itself. 
2. The Potential for Contractor Corruption 
The potential for corruption is another issue frequently 
cited when dealing with contractors. These problems are 
often due to flaws in the bidding or outsourcing process 
itself and are preventable. By making use of rigorous open 
bidding procedures that include a clearly defined RFP 
(Request for Proposal) that specifically identify exact 
service requirements, written evaluation criteria, along with 
public access to all meetings and written records dealing 
with the selection process, the corruption incentive for the 
contractor is reduced. (Hanke, 1987) 
In the event of contractor corruption or even 
dissatisfaction by the government with the services being 
provided, the government pays the price in dollars and 
humiliation (Kettl, 1988). Dealing with an unsatisfactory 
contractor may be the ultimate outsourcing nightmare for many 
government officials. 
3. Lack of Competition for Contracts 
As a means for providing the best services at the lowest 
cost, contractors require competition to stimulate the market 
as consumers shop around for the best buys. Unfortunately 
for the government, the pool of contractors for a major 
service often may be small or non-existent. 
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When government services are not subjected to 
competitive bidding, the contractor becomes a monopolist and 
consequently the government typically pays a negotiated 
"going rate" (Hanke, 1987). If there are not several firms 
submitting bids on a contract there is no true competition 
and the government has no choice but to pay the asking price 
which may be more than it costs to perform the service in 
house. 
In some markets, competition is virtually non-existent 
or weak from the outset and may diminish over time. Initial 
suppliers may gain cumulative insider advantages and other 
firms respect the "turf" of the current contractor and will 
not underbid them. In this situation, again, outsourcing may 
be less rewarding for the government and much more costly. 
Additionally, as a monopolist, the firm sees less need to 
create new services or innovations, and the client has little 
or no way to express preferences or any alternatives to fall 
back on should minimum service desires not be accomplished 
(Hanke, 1987). 
It is often difficult for the government to cancel a 
contract for reasons of poor performance. Even if alternate 
producers are readily available, the government incurs delay 
and additional costs in setting up a new bidding process. 
Additionally, the further off the shelf the good or service, 
such as a unique weapon or communications system, or the 
maintenance for such a system, the less competition. It is 
more difficult to write specifications and find competitive 
bidders for these types of services due to the complexity of 
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the tasks involved in production and one-of-a-kind servicing 
needs such equipment demand. Contractors may simply be less 
willing to take a risk. Larger contractors become 
monopolies, selling their product exclusively to the 
government (Kettl, 1988). 
Competition itself is often constrained by other public 
goals such as awarding contracts to small and minority firms. 
The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 
John Deutch, said that the way the Department of Defense 
...has bought things in the past has often 
been used as an instrument of social change. 
Buying from small businesses, buying from minority- 
owned businesses, buying from businesses that give 
special preferences to veterans—a whole series of 
restrictions have been put in place so that the 
government procurement process is, in part, an 
important and progressive instrument of change. 
(Technology Review, 1994) 
The efficiency that competition is meant to promote in 
practice often loses out to these objectives. 
The above sections have provided background information 
relevant to this thesis. An examination of actual 
experiences of a Navy Command in outsourcing will follow in 
Chapter III. 
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III.    OUTSOURCING IN PRACTICE 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
There are many considerations to be assessed in making 
outsourcing decisions. Although certain services that are 
candidates for outsourcing may be similar throughout the 
military (e.g.,food services, custodial services, utilities), 
each potential outsourcing project is unique and may be 
subject to local constraints. Therefore, the outsourcing 
project must be treated by officials involved on a case by 
case basis. 
Contract operations have become a popular alternative 
for many government agencies other than the military. Many 
municipal governments have turned to outsourcing in an effort 
to increase efficiency and reduce cost (Mangravite and 
Moffitt, 1993). Prior to discussion of military outsourcing, 
it is useful to examine a case of an outsourcing success in a 
municipality. 
The number of small municipalities contracting out the 
operation and maintenance of their entire public works 
operations is growing. Public/private partnership may give 
city public works staff opportunities to learn technical and 
operational skills from private firms. It also may lower 
costs and the administrative burden for city personnel. The 
experience of public works administrators in Mustang, 
Oklahoma is presented in the following section. 
B.   THE CASE OF KUSTAHG, OKLAHOMA 
In September 1992, city officials in Mustang, Oklahoma 
entered into a partnership by assigning the operation, 
21 
maintenance, and management of its public works department to 
a private firm. As a result, costs have dropped, and the 
burden on city administrative personnel has been reduced. 
Mustang, incorporated in 1969, is a 12-square mile, primarily 
residential community with a population of 11,000 in the 
Oklahoma City metropolitan area. The city had purchased 
wastewater treatment services from Oklahoma City, but 
recently constructed its own wastewater treatment facilities 
to help ensure the continued growth of the community. (Long 
and Merrill, 1993) 
Shortly after the January 1992 start-up of a new $3.5 
million secondary wastewater treatment facility, the city 
found its staff was experiencing difficulty providing proper 
operation of the plant's laboratory. At about the same time, 
city officials had also become concerned about maintaining 
compliance with increasing Safe Drinking Water Act 
requirements and new, complex testing regulations for its 
eight water wells. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
Taking a cue from Oklahoma City, and nearby Yukon, 
Oklahoma (both contract out wastewater treatment facility 
operations and maintenance), city leaders turned to a private 
firm for assistance. Houston-based Professional Services 
Group, Inc. (PSG) quickly provided Mustang with a certified 
laboratory technician, fully licensed with the Oklahoma state 
Department of Health, to operate and manage all laboratory 
functions. Through the improved performance of its 
laboratory operations, Mustang officials recognized that 
contract operations could potentially improve city water and 
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wastewater treatment operations as well as its other public 
works services. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
After conducting thorough research of contract 
operations, Mustang officials issued requests for proposals 
to more than 12 O&M firms. After receiving proposals from 
several firms, city officials determined the expertise and 
cost savings attainable by contracting out all Mustang public 
works services made that option worth pursuing. In September 
1992, Mustang contracted PSG to assume the operation, 
maintenance, and management of its public works department. 
(Long and Merrill, 1993) 
Under the agreement PSG duties include operation, 
maintenance, and management of Mustang's water and wastewater 
treatment, collection, and distribution system's meter 
reading; sanitation services; street maintenance; and animal 
control. PSG is also responsible for paying all of the 
department's day-to-day operating costs. The city maintains 
responsibility for setting user rates, customer billing, 
capital improvements, and long-term planning decisions. 
(Long and Merrill, 1993) 
The firm retained 15 full-time city public works 
employees, providing the former city staff comparable salary 
rates and increased benefits. The firm also hired the city 
director of public works to serve as project manager. The 
project manager and his staff now have access to managerial 
and technical support personnel, and other resources of the 
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national firm, to aid in the development of innovative 
approaches to providing public works services. (Long and 
Merrill, 1993) 
Contract operations has reduced the administrative 
burden typically associated with operating, maintaining, and 
managing a public works department. For example, the city no 
longer has to monitor public works payroll and process the 
department's purchase orders and materials contracts. This 
is providing Mustang city government more time to focus on 
planning and preparing for the continued growth of the 
community. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
Mustang issued a record $7 million in residential 
building permits during 1992 and the rapidly growing 
community is presently only approximately 40 percent 
developed. By utilizing a private firm to operate and 
maintain its public works department, the city is improving 
its public works department while ensuring essential public 
works services can expand to match community growth. (Long 
and Merrill, 1993) 
1.  Specialized Programs 
PSG is implementing a comprehensive employee training 
and development program to enhance the skills of the public 
works staff in Mustang. Employees are receiving classroom 
instruction and hands-on training in subjects ranging from 
wastewater treatment theory to energy and chemical 
conservation techniques. In addition, operators are 
encouraged through an incentive program to increase 
certification and skill levels. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
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The contractor has also established a comprehensive 
employee safety program. Employees are supplied with steel- 
toed safety boots and protective eyewear. Workers are 
learning various safety procedures through classroom 
instruction, such as confined space entry, lock out/tag out, 
and record keeping. The staff is also provided incentives 
for achieving a good safety record. These safety 
improvements have helped to substantially reduce worker 
compensation claims within the department, which had been 
averaging approximately $100,000 a year when operated by the 
city.  (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
To ensure that the tests performed at the city 
wastewater laboratory are accurate, PSG has implemented a 
quality assurance and quality control program, which 
establishes testing standards that exceed the recommendations 
of the EPA. Lab personnel perform daily double test 
validations and a monthly accuracy and precision review. A 
PSG laboratory standards manager performs annual audits of 
laboratory procedures. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
2.  Infrastructure Maintenance 
The firm installed a computerized maintenance program, 
which schedules and tracks maintenance duties within the 
Mustang public works department. The system permits more 
comprehensive planning and scheduling of preventive and 
corrective maintenance. Potential maintenance backlogs are 
quickly identified and scheduled by priorities so maintenance 
workers can make more effective use of their time. The 
maintenance program also helps to increase day-to-day 
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efficiency of the department by optimizing equipment 
performance, limiting equipment downtime, and preventing 
costly premature equipment failures. This high degree of 
attention to preventive maintenance is protecting substantial 
city investment in infrastructure. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
At the start of contract operations and maintenance, PSG 
maintenance specialists performed a Comprehensive Maintenance 
Evaluation (CME) of more than 40 different pieces of 
equipment. The CME utilized vibration analysis, 
thermographic analysis, and electrical studies to reveal 
defects and inefficiencies that would have likely gone 
undetected until a problem occurred. For example, the CME 
vibration analysis revealed that three pumps (valued at more 
than $50,000) at the new city wastewater facility were 
operating outside of design specifications and causing 
significant premature wear. This new information has allowed 
the city to contact the manufacturer and correct the problem 
while the pumps were still under warranty, thus averting 
future repair or replacement costs. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
Mustang is utilizing the private firm's technical 
expertise to improve public works services. For example, 
when plant operators at the city's new wastewater treatment 
facility began experiencing compliance difficulties due to 
excessive solids build-up, PSG (at the time still in contract 
negotiations with the city) quickly developed and implemented 
an effective solids management program for Mustang. Working 
closely with plant operators, the Oklahoma State Department 
of Health, and the EPA, the firm quickly obtained the permits 
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required to beneficially use the 300 dry tons of biosolids 
generated annually.  PSG now uses a subsurface injection 
vehicle to apply the biosolids for use as fertilizer to 
several hundred acres of pasture land and cotton fields. 
(Long and Merrill,, 1993) 
The private firm recently assisted the city in the 
installation of an aeration system to boost the dissolved 
oxygen level of wastewater facility effluent. The firm 
designed the system as part of its contract duties for the 
city. All labor required for the upgrade was performed by 
PSG employees and the firm completed the upgrade for only 
the cost of materials, resulting in a 50 percent cost savings 
compared with the original cost estimates. The system now 
increases dissolved oxygen content in the effluent to a 
permitted level of 0.06 mg/L or more before discharge to the 
South Canadian River.  (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
The private firm is also assisting Mustang with several 
pending upgrades of eight water wells and the 85-mile potable 
water distribution system. PSG is reviewing all proposed 
capital improvements and is providing O&M input for designers 
and suggesting potential alternatives to reduce the city's 
capital investment. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
3.  Conclusion 
Contract O&M of the Mustang public works department has 
resulted in an annual savings of about $200,000. In 
addition, Mustang no longer has to bear the cost of 
unscheduled expenses such as overtime, lost time, pay raises, 
and other unplanned variables in the budget. City leaders 
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are planning to use a portion of these savings to finance 
various infrastructure expansions and improvements within the 
community public works department. (Long and Merrill, 1993) 
During the mid-1980s, Mustang had the highest utility 
rates of any community in the Oklahoma City metropolitan 
area. Over the past six years, the city has not implemented 
a single rate increase for its utility customers, and does 
not anticipate an increase in the immediate future. Contract 
operations and maintenance of the Mustang public works 
department is helping to provide high-quality, cost-effective 
municipal services to the community. (Long and Merrill, 
1993) 
It is evident from the case of Mustang, OK, that 
outsourcing can be of great benefit to a government agency in 
terms of cost savings, increased efficiency and quality of 
service. An examination of outsourcing in the military 
environment is the focus of the next section. 
C.   BACKGROUND OF COMNAVAIRPAC 
1.  Mission 
The primary function of COMNAVAIRPAC is the training and 
logistical support of all naval air units in the Pacific to 
develop their operation readiness and combat efficiency for 
service with the U.S. Third and Seventh Fleets. Third and 
Seventh Fleets include more than 60,000 personnel, 1900 
aircraft in more than 110 squadrons, and six aircraft 
carriers. Operational control of ships and aircraft is 
exercised by the numbered fleet commander (Third or Seventh) 
to whom they are assigned. 
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2.  Resources 
With the COMNAVAIRPAC area of influence spanning over 
100 million square miles from the Arctic to the Antarctic and 
from the west coast of the Americas into the Indian Ocean, 
the authority for management control over diverse forces 
ashore, afloat and in the air is delegated to subordinate 
commanders. In 1933, four of five former Functional Wing 
commands completed a reorganization into nine Type Wing 
commands, making each wing administratively and logistically 
responsible for a specific type of aircraft. The nine Type 
Wing commanders have their headquarters along the West Coast 
of the United States at Naval Air Stations North Island, 
Miramar and Lemoore, in California, and Whidbey Island in 
Washington. They report directly to COMNAVAIRPAC. 
Commander Fleet Air Western Pacific (COMFAIRWESTPAC) at 
Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan, and his representatives at 
Naval Air Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean represent 
COMNAVAIRPAC in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Just 
as COMFAIRWESTPAC acts with COMNAVAIRPAC authority ashore, 
carrier group commanders (COMCARGRUs) serve as COMNAVAIRPAC 
representatives at sea. 
Normally composed of one or more aircraft carriers, 
carriers groups with their embarked air squadrons form the 
heart of Navy strike capability. Four Carrier group staffs 
and three cruiser-destroyer groups are currently assigned to 
the Pacific Fleet. The aircraft carriers USS Independence 
(CV-62), USS Kitty Hawk  (CV-63), USS Constellation  (CV-64), 
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USS Nimitz  (CVN-68), USS Carl Vinson  (CVN-70), and USS 
Abraham Lincoln  (CVN-72) comprise the Pacific Fleet carrier 
strike force. 
COMNAVAIRPAC is responsible for 16 Naval Air 
Stations/Facilities: NAS Adak, NAS Alameda, NAS Agana, NAF 
Atsugi, NAS Barbers Point, NAF Misawa, NAF El Centro, NSF 
Diego Garcia, NAS Fallon, NAS Lemoore, NAF Kadena, NAS 
Miramar, NALF San Clemente, NAS Moffet Field, NAS North 
Island, and NAS Whidbey Island. Support also is provided for 
some 675 Marine Corps aircraft in the Pacific assigned to 
more than USMC 40 squadrons. 
D.   OUTSOURCING PROFILE 
Although each station is unique, some common functions 
are outsourced at the majority of these stations. A list is 
provided in Appendix A. Often, these services are outsourced 
together in a large BOS (Base Operations Support) contract. 
If after performing the required Commercial Activities Study 
(which includes extensive management studies and cost 
analysis) it is determined that outsourcing is an appropriate 
measure, the wage rate is determined by DoL and a synopsis is 
sent to Commerce Business Daily. Once the solicitation is 
printed, the proposal phase begins. The POA&M for a BOS 
contract for Diego Garcia follows the following sequence: 
1. PACDIV receives and analyzes the proposals (3 days) 
2. PERT Eval/Price Analysis and the establishment 
of a competitive range (17 days) 
3. Pre-BOS contract prepared and forwarded to NAVFAC 
(23 days) 
4. Tech clarification request prepared (30 days) 
30 
5. NAVFAC review/pre-BC approval (14 days) 
6. Request tech clarifications and receive revised 
tech proposals and evaluate (22 days) 
7. Request and receive best and final offers (8 days) 
8. Evaluate best and final offers and establish award 
recommendation (9 days) 
9. Prepare and forward final post-BC and forward to 
NAVFAC, and receive EEO/PAS clearances (31 days) 
10. NAVFAC reviews and approves post-BC (21 days) 
11. CHINFO clearances are obtained (7 days) 
12. Award BOS contract 
13. Mobilization (60 days) 
14. Transition (121 days) 
15. Begin full performance 
After the contract has been awarded and full performance 
begins, the station has the task of monitoring and assessing 
contractor performance over the duration of the contract, 
usually five years, with an option each year after the 
initial year. 
COMNAVAIRPAC follows the guidance in the Commercial 
Activities regulations in initiating and implementing 
outsourcing. The next section identifies concerns that 
personnel involved in the process have observed as researched 
through personal interviews. 
E.  MANAGERIAL CONCERNS WITH OUTSOURCING 
It is well and good that Pentagon decision makers view 
outsourcing as a possible solution to alleviating increasing 
fiscal stress. However, the majority of outsourcing is 
completed at an individual command level. The "people in the 
trenches" actually working on a daily basis with contracts 
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and contractors are in a position to determine exactly what 
works, what has potential, and what is completely off the 
mark regarding outsourcing with respect to their command. 
In an effort to operate the Department of the Navy in 
the most efficient manner, command authorities have 
established outsourcing goals for major claimants 
(CINCPACFLT, July 94). Possible benefits derived from the 
utilization of outsourcing as a management tool to offset 
resource reductions have become too significant to ignore as 
the latest new management fad. Claimants on Navy resources 
have submitted plans to achieve targeted savings. 
As a claimant, COMNAVAIKPAC has considerable interest in 
the formulation and execution of any outsourcing plans that 
may come from the Outsourcing Selection Committee at 
CINCPACFLT. Personnel at COMNAVAIRPAC work on a daily basis 
to carry out policy regarding any outsourcing decisions. The 
experiences of COMNAVAIRPAC with outsourcing may typify those 
of other military installations. Interviews with COMNAVAIRPAC 
personnel reflected a keen awareness on their part of 
important issues involved with outsourcing. This section 
addresses major concerns relative to outsourcing expressed by 
key COMNAVAIRPAC personnel. 
1.  Cost Growth Problems 
Costs for operating stations supported by BOS contracts 
demonstrate cost growth exceeding an equivalent station 
operated by government resources. Reasons for this are 
identified in the following sections. 
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a.  Statutory   Nage   Rate   Increases 
One reason for this occurrence is that statutory 
wage rate increases periodically provided to contractor 
employees outstrip wage increases to federal employees. 
These wage increases are applied to contracts for each option 
year of the contract (first initial year plus four option 
years) and can increase the cost of labor by as much as 10 
percent per year. Since service contracts are labor 
intensive contracts, the costs for these wage increases are 
significant. (Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
b.      Changes   in   Contract   Requirements 
Changes in requirements can also propagate an 
increase in the cost of a service contract. Modifications in 
contract requirements typically involve an increase in 
services performed or an expansion of scope. Such changes 
necessitate contract renegotiation. 
Changes in the contract due to unforeseen 
requirements must be added to the contract if the new 
requirement is within scope. A new contract must be 
negotiated if the additional requirements are not within 
contract scope. Effecting any changes in a contract or 
negotiating a new contract can be a slow process. 
Examination of the contract to determine if the new 
requirements are within contract scope taxes time. 
Additionally, if new requirements can be written into the 
contract, they must be written accurately and precisely 
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worded, usually a time consuming task. Prices for the new 
requirements must also be negotiated. A renegotiated 
contract may favor the contractor in price.  (Shore 
Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
If new requirements are not within the scope of the 
existing contract, a new contract must be negotiated. The 
Navy may want to retain the same contractor for the new 
contract but has the option of receiving bids from other 
contractors. The process of starting anew with a new 
contract is a lengthy and incurs additional costs. 
Renegotiations or additional new contracts drawn up to 
accommodate new requirements can be very expensive for the 
Navy. (Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
c. Deficiencies   in   Written   Statement   of 
Contract    Requirements 
Another similar concern involves the actual 
statement of contract requirements. These requirements are 
often poorly written. Poorly stated requirements leave the 
door open for misinterpretations by the contractor on exactly 
what is desired by the Navy, which consequently may lead to 
poor contractor performance. 
In this situation, re-performance is often 
prescribed, leading to costly delays in completion of the 
service. Granted, there is no perfect service contract, and 
the DoD is making an effort to improve the negotiating and 
writing process of contracting; however, there is still much 
to be accomplished in this area. (Shore Activities, 
COMNAVAIRPAC) 
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e. Lack   of   Competition   for   Contracts 
The lack of competition for the contracts on some 
of the remote facilities in COMNAVAIRPAC care has created an 
untenable situation. COMNAVAIRPAC is responsible for several 
facilities located in remote areas. Each of these facilities 
is run almost exclusively by BOS contract. Costs for an 
overseas station such as Diego Garcia have been consistently 
greater than those for in house bases (see Figure 1 below) 
due to the fact that there is often a lack of competition 
among contractors for the contract to maintain and operate 
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Figure 1. Percent Growth from FY-85 Baseline from Shore 
Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC 
d. Poor   Contract   Administration   and 
Surveillance 
Poorly performed contract administration and 
surveillance also contribute to the cost growth problem 
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(Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). Contract administrators 
often are not subject matter experts on the type of service 
being contracted. Contractors can take advantage of this 
since they employ shrewd negotiators who know the ins and 
outs of there business very well indeed. Oversight is 
difficult as insufficient numbers of available specially 
qualified Navy personnel are available to monitor and control 
the contracting relationship. 
2.  Administrative Problems 
The following section identifies several administrative 
problems facing COMNAVAIRPAC as they implement an outsourcing 
initiative. 
a. Lack   of   Contract   Authority   and   Control 
of Resources 
COMNAVAIRPAC is a fleet command. It does not hold 
contracting authority. Therefore, it must rely on external 
contracting agents to develop, award, and administer 
contracts on its behalf. This effectively places a third 
party into what is already a complex and ponderous task of 
contracting out a service. (Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
Within the Air Force and Army, operating commands 
are provided contracting authority. Within the Navy, only 
systems commands and certain, specialized commands are 
provided contracting authority and perform this function for 
fleet commands. Another non-value adding layer of 
bureaucracy in the contracting hierarchy is not conducive to 
producing effective operations support contracts at fleet 
shore stations. (Comptroller, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
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Commanders from direct control of their resources. 
Commanders cannot deal directly with a contractor; they must 
use a contract administrator as a mediator between the 
contractor and themselves. Contract administrators are 
accountable only to the contracting agent, not the station 
commander. Consequently, the contract administrator's actions 
and performance are not within the direct chain of command, 
of the installation commander,and hence are beyond control. 
This situation may lead to goal incongruence between the 
contractor and the installation commander. 
The contract administration process may not be 
compatible with the vision or goal of the installation 
commander. Incongruent goals can only lead to 
incompatibility of priorities and possible bitterness between 
contractor and installation as the project progresses. 
(Comptroller, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
b.       Reduced   Flexibility 
Another significant management problem with 
outsourcing is that of reduced flexibility. Assigning a 
function to contract performance is generally a one-way 
street. Once the service is outsourced, it is very difficult 
to return that service to in house performance (Shore 
Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
Billets are often cut to only a few expert 
personnel who remain to retain core capabilities for 
contingency purposes. The cost of reclaiming an outsourced 
service can be high. Start-up costs may be high, and 
escalate in the circumstance of contract cancellation due to 
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unsatisfactory contractor performance. As a result, 
outsourced functions typically remain outsourced, even in the 
most uncomfortable of situations for the Navy. 
c. Profit   Motives   of   Contractors 
The profit motivation of contractors is also viewed 
as a area of concern by COMNAVAIRPAC personnel. On some 
occasions, this objective becomes all encompassing, and the 
quality of contractor performance suffers due to poorly 
written contracts. Contractors are not motivated to go 
beyond the minimum stated requirement. The poor condition of 
contractor operated stations tends to bear this out (Shore 
Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
d. Potential    for   Corruption 
The potential for corruption of contractors is an 
issue frequently cited when discussing the disadvantages of 
outsourcing. The DoD has had some undeniably harrowing 
experiences with corrupt contractors. Unfortunately, there 
are probably very few government agencies that have not had 
to deal with this issue and COMNAVAIRPAC is no different 
(Budget Officer, COMNAVAIRPAC). Corruption need not be 
blatant theft of millions of dollars. Merely taking 
advantage of the mistakes of inexperienced government 
contract writers and administrators now and again can add up 
to significant amounts of money. 
F.   CONCLUSIONS 
When an outsourcing success story similar to that of 
Mustang, Oklahoma is published, it can cause great optimism 
and anticipation in government channels that motivate 
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government agencies such as the DoD to begin new outsourcing 
initiatives and encourage expansion of existing programs. 
COMNAVAIRPAC and the Mustang public works department are both 
government entities, yet their experiences with outsourcing 
have been vastly different. 
The Mustang contractor was willing and able to perform 
the services required within the limited realm of the 
operations of the public works department. The COMNAVAIRPAC 
situation differs for the BOS contracts in that the scope is 
broader. The operations and maintenance of a base 
encompasses a greater variety of services, and is not merely 
a subset of administrative and personnel duties within one 
department as in Mustang. 
Outsourcing on a smaller scale, with functions limited 
in scope, has much more potential for successful 
implementation, as do outsourcing tasks that have an 
equivalent counterpart in the private sector. Requirements 
are more easily written for smaller specific tasks such as 
providing food services, or custodial services than for 
providing entire O&M for a base. 
For example, food services and custodial services are 
commonly available in the private sector and would translate 
easily into an outsourcing scenario; however, running a base 
has been the military's exclusive purview until recently, and 
while individual tasks of the operations and maintenance of 
an installation may equate to a private function, the 
aggregate day-to-day operations may be far more intricate. 
Satisfactory performance in every area of such a contract is 
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difficult if not impossible. Monitoring a limited scope 
outsourcing project is significantly less complicated as 
well. 
COMNAVAIRPAC has identified several areas in which 
outsourcing could result in significant savings. ADP 
functions. Photo Labs, Bachelor Quarters Management, Galley 
Operations, and Family Service Centers, Transportation, 
Hazardous Materials/Waste Management, Facilities Maintenance 
are among the programs that have realistic potential for 
successful outsourcing (CINCPACFLT, June 94). Police and 
Fire protection may provide vast cost savings when 
congressional restrictions are lifted and outsourcing of 
these functions is no longer prohibited.(Shore Activities, 
COMNAVAIRPAC) 
Outsourcing has become a popular method of 
simultaneously reducing government expenditures and improving 
the efficiency of government services. Proponents of 
outsourcing point to the apparent satisfaction of most 
government decision makers, such as those in Mustang, OK, in 
achieving the dual aims of economy and efficiency. This has 
spurred contracting initiatives throughout the federal 
government, including the DoD. 
Outsourcing may be successful if applied skillfully and 
judiciously. Mustang, Oklahoma has obviously benefited 
greatly from contracting out its public works department. 
The COMNAVAIRPAC experience with outsourcing the operations 
and maintenance of several its installations has not been as 
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good. Several items of concern were discussed in the 
previous section. The next chapter will analyze and 
interpret these concerns. 
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IV.    INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Contracting out has become a popular method of 
simultaneously reducing government expenditures and improving 
the efficiency of government services. It may be argued that 
the benefits of outsourcing have been the subject of much 
attention while the drawbacks have been quietly swept under 
the rug. To benefit from outsourcing, its limits must be 
identified and taken into consideration prior to commitment 
to an outsourcing initiative. An awareness and understanding 
of potential deficiencies may preclude monumental mistakes. 
The issues raised in Chapter III are significant and 
varied. This chapter will discuss and analyze the problem 
areas identified by COMNAVAIRPAC and address each item within 
these problem areas. 
B.   COST GROWTH PROBLEMS 
Costs for operating and maintaining a station supported 
by a BOS contract consistently exceed the costs for an 
equivalent station operated by in house resources. Some of 
the reasons for this occurrence are: (1) statutory wage 
increases; (2) changes in contractor requirements; (3) 
deficiencies in written statement of requirements; (4) poor 
contract administration and surveillance; and (5) lack of 
competition between contractors for contracts. 
1.  Statutory Wage Rate Increases 
The law requires that contractor employees receive wage 
rate increases. These increases are applied to the contracts 
for each option year. At times, they can increase the cost 
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of labor by as much as 10 percent per year. These increases 
can exceed wage increases to federal employees. It follows 
that it may be cheaper to maintain the function in house if 
labor for the contractor is so expensive. 
Since these wage rate increases are determined by the 
Department of Labor and usually based on the rate of 
inflation, the command can estimate and budget for the 
increase. However, if the increase is greater than the rate 
budgeted as was the case for one station, the station must 
absorb the additional cost. The contractor must be paid, 
therefore the money usually is extracted from another 
program. Recurring unbudgeted outlays are not good operating 
procedure. 
Contractors are aware of regulations and know the DoL 
will provide for a wage rate increase every option year of 
the contract. Shrewd (or crooked) negotiators may even 
underbid to get the initial contract, then in the option 
years, make up the difference from their low bid in wage rate 
increases, much to the dismay and disgruntlernent of the 
command. (Budget Officer, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
COMNAVAIRPAC has watched benefits tangible during the 
first year of a contract evaporate in the years thereafter 
when the time for renewal appeared. Contractors often submit 
a bid, win the contract, then proceed to cut costs 
dramatically in whatever ways are at their disposal (e.g., by 
firing staff). Consequently, existing workers become so 
thinly spread that the quality of performance of the service 
suffers (Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
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2. Changes in Contract Requirements 
In the process of executing a contract, the need to 
change a requirement(s) arises. One of the most significant 
drawbacks to outsourcing is the reduced ability to make 
changes in production (Hanke, 1987). Usually, these changes 
are work increases. If the change is within the scope of the 
contract, then an additional requirement can be added to the 
existing contract after renegotiations of price. If the 
change is not within it the scope of the existing contract, a 
new contract must be obtained. (Shore Activities, 
COMNAVAIRPAC) 
In either event, the process to accomplish a change in a 
contract requirement can be an expensive evolution for the 
Navy in terms of both time and money due to the renegotiation 
process necessary for the existing contract to incorporate 
the changes or fresh negotiations for a new contract to 
fulfill the additional requirements. Price adjustments, 
usually increases, invariably occur. A change in a 
requirement at a non-contract base is not nearly as expensive 
or time consuming. An equivalent service performed at a non- 
contract station would probably be accomplished at less cost 
(Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
3. Deficiencies in Written Statements of 
Contract Requirements 
Outsourcing has been suggested as a method for reducing 
expenditures on services traditionally provided by the public 
sector. In evaluating production of a good or service for 
outsourcing, it is not enough to merely demonstrate that 
private enterprise could perform the job more efficiently. 
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Contract terms must ensure that some of the gains from this 
productivity are shared with the government. The challenge 
is to create agreements that make government better off than 
if it operated its own facility (Holcombe, 1991). 
An old axiom that may be applied here is, "If you want 
something done right the first time, do it yourself." It can 
be a very arduous task to communicate to a contractor exactly 
what is desired on paper. Unfortunately, the consequences of 
poorly written contracts can be devastating. Contractors 
employ highly skilled writers who are experts in their field. 
These people are very quick to spot weaknesses in a 
government contract and will exploit their advantage (Budget 
Officer, COMNAVAIRPAC). Often, the contractor has at his 
disposal various legal remedies that can serve to increase 
the contract price because federal acquisition regulations 
can favor the contractor over the government (Shore 
Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
The people who write government contracts play a 
critical role in the outsourcing process. Their civilian 
counterparts are willing to spend the time required to ensure 
that the verbiage is correct and precise, leaving no room for 
interpretational discrepancies. In short, it is their job to 
see that the contract is in the best interests of their 
company. The government, it would appear from COMNAVAIRPAC 
concerns, does not have the same dedicated equivalent. 
Often, the government does not have subject matter 
experts to cover every type of contract and begin the 
negotiations with a distinct disadvantage. Individuals who 
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write government contracts are integral to the success of an 
outsourcing initiative. The present caliber of training of 
these professionals in government service is below par and 
their abilities must be honed (Friedberg, 1991). Multi- 
million dollar mistakes are not uncommon. There would be 
fewer mistakes of this magnitude if the contract writer for 
the government was held accountable for the error and be well 
compensated for their successes (Budget Officer, 
COMNAVAIRPAC). The importance of a well-written contract 
cannot be underestimated. 
4.  Poor Contract Administration and Surveillance 
Poorly performed contract administration and 
surveillance contribute to the cost growth problem (Shore 
Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). Contract administrators are often 
not subject matter experts on the type of service being 
contracted, which leads to difficulties in oversight of the 
contract. A significant disadvantage to outsourcing is a 
reduced ability to monitor performance (Hanke, 1987). 
After a firm has been awarded a contract, the Navy must 
be prepared to monitor and control to the extent possible, 
contractor performance. Monitoring is used primarily as a 
preventive, not a punitive measure. Ideally, monitoring will 
uncover nothing but the fact that the contractor is in 
compliance with all provisions. Monitoring does entail 
additional costs to the government but these may be cheaper 
than the potential price of not monitoring. Efficient 
monitoring, although costly, typically will pay for itself by 
preventing overcharges and poor quality performance in the 
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first place, by recouping inappropriate outlays, and by 
disallowing payment for inadequate performance (Prager, 
1994). 
Monitoring for quality control refers to comparing the 
quantity and quality of product or service delivered against 
contract specifications.  Product quality normally is 
simpler to monitor than service quality, because product 
specifications tend to be more precise. More intense 
monitoring is called for when the contracted good is vital 
and service disruption will have substantial deleterious 
consequences (Prager, 1994). 
Additionally, monitoring is even more critical when the 
contractor incentive and ability to cheat is present. The 
costs of monitoring can be significant. Sometimes, managing 
a contract can lead to the creation of a large contracting 
bureaucracy within the contractee's organization.  The costs 
of managing outsourcing can exceed the costs of producing the 
service in house (Prager, 1994). 
Contracts do not monitor themselves and contracts that 
demand complex monitoring are likely to be inadequately or 
inefficiently monitored. In such instances, in house 
production may be less costly as the apparent savings from 
outsourcing are overwhelmed by monitoring and other 
contracting costs. The Navy must resist pressure to 
outsource until the need for quality contract management is 
met and adequate resources are devoted to it.(Prager, 1994) 
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5.  Lack of Competition for Contracts 
"The injection of competition into the procurement 
process is the critical feature of outsourcing that ensures 
expected cost savings." (Morgan, 1992). 
COMNAVAIRPAC concerns regarding competition are well 
founded. In an area where competitive contractors exist in 
plenty such as a large city, the Navy appears to benefit from 
outsourcing. However, in a remote or isolated location, the 
advantages of outsourcing are reduced since the Navy may have 
to pay premium price for contractor provided services (e.g., 
Fallon). In this situation, retaining the function in house 
may be the most worthwhile option. 
Competition may give the Navy the flexibility of 
switching among alternate suppliers and enhanced bargaining 
power. If the Navy has the opportunity to purchase goods 
elsewhere, then the contractor may be less likely to pass 
costs on to the government since competition works best when 
the pool of potential suppliers is large (Morgan, 1992). 
However, the advantages are only worthwhile if the Navy can 
assure itself of both the reliability of services and the 
ability to maintain competition later at points of contract 
renewal (Hanke, 1987). 
The absence of an adequate number of vendors competing 
will yield less than optimal results. The absence of market 
competition among contractors should induce the government to 
consider in house production even when the good or service is 
available from a contractor whose costs are lower. In 
essence, the government is looking to eliminate monopolies 
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and encourage competition between suppliers. Through these 
measures, it hopes to force the entity to run more 
efficiently (including those in house entities) and at lower 
prices. 
Often, selecting a contractor is a complex process. 
Competition among contractors plays a key role because the 
most efficient manner of choosing a contractor is through a 
competitive bidding process. Collusion among bidders is a 
real danger, because the incentive structure of competitive 
bids is designed to benefit the contractee at the expense of 
the bidders. Even the potential winning bidder may gain from 
a collusive arrangement, because both the contract award is 
higher and the cost of bidding is lower. Even if there are 
multiple bidders, competition cannot taken for granted for 
in its absence, the gains from contracting will be diminished 
if not dissipated entirely (Prager, 1994). 
COMNAVAIRPAC experience with the lack of competition 
probably is not unique. There is simply not enough 
competition for the contracts to maintain and operate their 
remote facilities. Consequently, the Navy pays premium prices 
for the maintenance and operations of lower priority bases 
while facing funding cuts that inevitably are absorbed by the 
higher priority bases (Comptroller, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
COMNAVAIRPAC does not presently save money by outsourcing in 
a competition vacuum (Comptroller, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
Competition must be present to maximize the potential 
benefits of outsourcing. Otherwise, it would be more cost 
effective to keep the services in house. 
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C.   MANAGERIAL CONCERNS 
Administration of a contract is a complex process. The 
concerns identified by COMNAVAIRPAC surrounding this process 
are discussed in the following sections. The issues include: 
(1) lack of contracting authority and control of resources; 
(2) reduced flexibility; (3) the profit motives of 
contractors; and (4) potential corruption 
1.  Lack of Contract Authority and Control of 
Resources 
COMNAVAIRPAC is a fleet command and does not hold 
contracting authority. The command must rely on a third 
party for the development and administration of the contract. 
Adding another loop in an already complicated process only 
serves to generate confusion and increases the probability of 
communication and interpretational errors. 
As noted, in the Navy, only the systems commands and 
certain specialized commands have contracting authority. The 
Army and Air Force provide their operating commands with 
contracting authority. It is unfortunate that the Navy has 
not extended its fleet commanders the privilege. Commanders 
are charged with acting in the best interests of their 
installation and the Navy. They most likely know best the 
contracting needs of their organization. If advice or 
assistance is required, they can apply to the appropriate 
authority and receive whatever support necessary as they act 
in the best interest of their commands. An extra layer of 
bureaucracy often slows the process down to a crawl and 
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frustrates personnel, especially if the third party sees the 
command contracting requirements as something other than what 
the commanding officer determines. 
Similarly, service contracts remove station commanders 
from direct control of their resources. Since a commander 
cannot deal directly with a contractor, the contract 
administrator is his only link to the firm doing the work for 
his facility. Contract administrators are accountable to the 
contracting agent, therefore the facility commander exercises 
no direct control over contract administrator actions. 
Misunderstandings on the intent of the contract, 
requirements, or even conflicts in goals for the installation 
add to the turmoil already inherent in the contracting 
process. If there should be a serious disagreement between 
contractor and commander over an issue such as an equitable 
adjustment, an appeal to the Armed Services Board of 
Contracting may give the contractor the benefit of the doubt 
and find in his favor, leaving the commander with no further 
recourse (Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). The reputation of 
the contractor gained in the treatment of its past contracts, 
and smooth resolution of differences in contract 
interpretation, are items to consider when initially 
selecting a contractor to avoid expensive delays resulting 
from misunderstandings. 
A united front is vital to the success of the 
outsourcing and is a product of clear communication between 
the commander and the contract administrator. 
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2.  Reduced Flexibility 
It is extremely difficult for the Navy to impose 
meaningful penalties on delinquent contractors. Cancellation 
is the only real penalty for bad performance and it is so 
severe that the pressures to avoid it are tremendous. If 
invoked, it often is more painful for the Navy due to severe 
penalties written into contracts in the event of this 
circumstance, than for the contractor. The penalty may be 
more costly to the Navy than maintaining the contractor until 
completion of the contract. Additionally, cancellation 
leaves officials with the unpleasant task of starting from 
the beginning finding producers and restarting the bidding 
process anew. 
Once a function has been outsourced it is very costly to 
reclaim that function. Military billets may have been cut, 
facilities, materials and equipment sold. In short, the 
experienced personnel required, and the wherewithal to 
perform such a reclaimed service would have to be recovered 
from ground zero. The costs of starting production of a good 
or service may be high, much more than switching contractors. 
(Shore Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC) 
Additionally, a command that has already committed time 
and effort into exploring and advocating the commitment to 
outsource may be "inclined" to sign a less favorable 
agreement with the contractor rather than admit failure and 
begin the bidding process anew or revert back to government 
provision of the service due to political pressure. 
Government contracts provide employment for many voters. 
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Another critical aspect of reduced flexibility involves 
the force readiness factor. Should the United States become 
involved in a conflict requiring the mobilization of DoD 
components, commanders must have the capability and capacity 
to respond immediately to the demands of the President and 
Congress. While outsourcing may be an effective cost 
reducing tool in the near future in the existing peacetime 
setting, its long-term effects may be detrimental to the 
military in some cases depending on the particular outsourced 
function. Retaining "core capability" of an outsourced 
service may not be sufficient to meet contingency demands 
placed on a private firm in a wartime environment. 
The military may have to supplement a contractor, or 
reclaim an outsourced service using military personnel whose 
skill level has declined due to extensive outsourcing of that 
service. Gaps result in other critical areas because of the 
loss and inefficient performance (at least initially) may 
have serious repercussions on DoD efforts. Loss of ownership 
of facilities, and equipment relinquished to contractors 
during an outsourcing project may also have a negative impact 
on overall readiness. 
3.  Contractor Incentives Stem From Profit 
According to COMNAVAIRPAC, the prime motivation for 
contractors is profit. On some occasions, this objective 
becomes all encompassing, and the quality of contractor 
performance suffers. In COMNAVAIRPAC experience, some of 
their BOS contractors often have not been motivated to 
perform beyond minimum requirements as evidences by the 
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conditions of the contractor operated stations (Shore 
Activities, COMNAVAIRPAC). 
The drive to efficient production supposedly stems from 
the profit motive. A contractor will work to minimize costs 
hoping to share in the firm's profit because after all, the 
purpose of doing business is to make a profit. Contractor 
desire to turn a profit, however, should not automatically be 
correlated with its ability to perform a service efficiently, 
with high quality. (Prager, 1994) 
Contract design, whether it be fixed cost plus or 
incentive, also plays a vital role in how efficiently and 
effectively a contractor operates. The cost plus contract 
invites "moral hazard" since contractor incentive to hold 
down costs is eroded. The government pays for any additional 
costs incurred. The contractor has no incentive to operate 
efficiently because there is nothing extra to be gained by 
performing beyond minimum requirements. 
On the other hand, incentive contracts shift risk onto 
the contractor. Efficient performance can yield high rewards 
for the contractor while the price of inefficient performance 
may be expensive. The contractor will either benefit 
directly or pay for the overruns according to performance. 
Although contractors profit from productivity improvement, 
they may also lose when costs beyond contractor control turn 
up. (Prager, 1994) 
Improved quality is often touted as a significant 
advantage to outsourcing. Studies have found that private 
sector performs many equivalent services at costs 
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significantly lower than the government at levels of quality 
as high or higher (Fitzgerald, 1988). However, studies 
sometimes lack evidence about the quality of services, 
therefore making it difficult to judge whether lower costs 
result from greater efficiency or deteriorating quality. 
Some evidence does suggest that private producers have lower 
costs, but the picture is complicated by other studies 
showing no difference in costs or even higher costs among 
commercial providers (Hanke, 1987). 
Quality does not necessarily come automatically when a 
function is outsourced. Frequently, the military has 
selected contractors solely on a low bid basis. 
Unfortunately, the sacrifice of quality for the cheaper rate 
has often proven to be a costly mistake for the Navy and the 
DoD.  (Hanke, 1987) 
Not always will a firm award the contract to the lowest 
bidder. Other considerations are also taken into account 
such as past performance, reliability, and capacity. This 
may be a time consuming process but the avoidance of "low- 
balling" as well as the weeding out of poor potential and 
actual performers suggests that total contracting costs will 
be lower and quality higher in the long run. (Prager,1994) 
a. Different   Incentives   in   Government 
The incentive structure of the military is 
completely different from that of the private sector. There 
are few or no pressures produced by competition or the profit 
motive (Fitzgerald, 1988) with the recent exception of DBOF 
(Defense Business Operating Fund). 
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When compared to the incentives motivating the 
private contractor to good performance, the government and 
the military may appear woefully outgunned. However well the 
profit motive spurs private contractors to greater heights of 
efficiency, the government has other of motivational tools at 
its disposal. 
Monetary rewards do stimulate goal achievement but 
they are not the only type of incentive. Power, prestige, 
and altruistic -service to country" are all viable motives. 
Many people are willing to sacrifice monetary rewards for the 
power attainable in government positions. Additionally, the 
package of benefits that go along with base pay, job 
security, promotional opportunities are motives to compare to 
those offered in the private sector (Prager, 1994). 
The issue of public versus private sector 
efficiency may not lie exclusively in different attitudes 
toward monetary motivation. The willingness to address the 
bottom line can be identical whether the incentive is profit 
or an equally potent nonfinancial motivator. The evidence 
that private ownership is more efficient than public 
enterprise cannot be taken at face value. There is an 
assumption among advocates of outsourcing that private 
managers can deliver at lower costs services similar or 
superior to public managers. In fact, many public employees 
are as efficient as are private sector companies. (Prager, 
1994) 
It is no surprise that government operated 
activities are inefficient when public policy makers 
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deemphasize efficiency as a goal of the public sector, when 
management is not provided with sufficient flexibility to 
pursue efficiency goals, and when the incentive structure of 
the public sector either is neutral toward or even 
discourages cost saving. The issue is not inherent 
inefficiency as much as a lack of political will to establish 
efficiency as a high level priority of government operations. 
Profit may indeed be what motivates most 
contractors to perform effectively and efficiently. Not many 
are in business out of the goodness of their heart. The 
government has been criticized for its inefficiencies, 
however, this is not always due to lack of motivation of 
government employees. 
4.  Danger of Contractor Corruption 
Past public perceptions of defense contracting tend to 
fixate on revelations of $600 toilet seats and $436 hammers 
among other allegations of waste, fraud and abuse. For the 
average citizen, such stories tempt the conclusion that the 
entire outsourcing concept amounts to a feast for the 
corporate greedy. Often overlooked is the extent to which 
the Department of Defense and Congress share the blame for 
creating and encouraging abuses (Fitzgerald, 1988). 
Congressional involvement in the procurement process is 
such that each member may seek to assure that those defense 
dollars reach his or her district regardless of long term 
consequences on the procurement system. The DoD has been a 
good customer for companies in a great many congressional 
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districts, and members of congress do not want to see changes 
that will shift jobs out of their districts. (Defense 
Technology, 1994). 
Overcharges by contractors sometimes result from 
accounting methods mandated by Congress that require the 
pricing of overhead charges on spare parts and other 
centralized purchasing procedure devised to prevent the very 
waste that is perpetrated. Overpriced toilet seats and 
hammers do not occur because the Pentagon buys too many of 
these items too quickly, but too few too slowly in strict 
accordance with regulation. The allocation of overhead to 




V.       RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The DoD began an outsourcing initiative with OMB A-76. 
In doing its part to fully implement this initiative, the 
Navy has charged commanders with reaching targeted savings 
goals utilizing outsourcing as a means of achieving them. 
This thesis began with a discussion of the reasons for the 
trend of outsourcing including: (1) the growing cost-revenue 
squeeze on government; (2) public disillusionment with 
government programs; and (3) the magnitude of the federal 
deficit. 
Some generally accepted benefits of outsourcing were 
identified:  (1) release of government from day-to-day 
oversight of operations; (2) the injection of competition 
inspires greater efficiency and quality of workmanship; and 
(3) significant economic benefits derived. Items of 
distinction between the public and private sectors were 
identified to assist in understanding what constraints the 
government must operate under as opposed to the relative 
freedom of the private sector. 
Some common concerns with outsourcing were then noted: 
(1) lack of experienced contract negotiators; (2) potential 
for contractor corruption; and (3) lack of competition 
between contractors for a contract. 
The next chapter discussed outsourcing in the public 
sector in practice. The successful outsourcing of the 
Mustang, Oklahoma public works department was noted and 
discussed, followed by a discussion of the outsourcing 
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experience at COMNAVAIRPAC in San Diego, California. The 
concerns of COMNAVAIRPAC personnel were highlighted. They 
included: Cost growth problems of (1) statutory wage rate 
increases; (2) changes in contract requirements; (3) 
deficiencies in written statements of contracts; (4) poor 
administration and surveillance of contracts and contractors; 
and (5) lack of competition for contracts. Administrative 
concerns were (1) lack of contracting authority and control 
of resources; (2) reduced flexibility; (3) profit motives of 
contractors; and (4) the potential for contractor corruption. 
Chapter IV provided analysis and interpretation of these 
concerns. 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Define Contract Requirements and State Them 
Precisely 
Only if the work to be performed is defined succinctly, 
and stated without ambiguity can a contractor and client 
maintain a good working relationship and achieve the 
established objectives. The officials in the Mustang, 
Oklahoma public works department obviously were working with 
an experienced, well qualified contractor. The aims of the 
contract were specific and consequently, the outsourcing 
initiative was effective due to this and other reasons 
mentioned. COMNAVAIRPAC experience with its BOS contracted 
stations indicate that the terms of the contract at times are 
not being written clearly or specifically enough. 
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2. Continue to Improve Training for Contract 
Administrators 
Knowledgeable contract administrators are vital to the 
success of an outsourcing initiative. These personnel must 
be brought up to the performance capability standards of 
their private sector counterparts. The DoD cannot afford to 
be at a disadvantage in the early stages of the contracting 
process. Millions of dollars can be lost by improper 
administration of contracts. 
3. Factor in the Cost of Oversight 
If a successful outsourcing project is desired, then 
costs of monitoring the execution of the function must be 
taken into account at the inception of the outsourcing plan. 
The Navy must be prepared to monitor contractor 
performance. Monitoring does entail additional costs, but 
these may be cheaper than the potential price of not 
monitoring. Efficient monitoring should eventually pay for 
itself by preventing overcharges and poor quality performance 
in the first place, by recouping inappropriate outlays, and 
by disallowing payment for inadequate performance. However, 
when the costs of managing the contract outweigh the cost of 
maintaining the service in house, outsourcing is 
inappropriate (Prager, 1994). Actual costs are difficult to 
estimate in advance. 
4. Ensure a Competitive Environment Exists Among 
Contractors 
Competition between contractors is present, the 
government is able to negotiate for a competitive level of 
output at a competitive price. The contractor in turn has 
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incentive to produce the service efficiently as the firm 
bears the cost of inefficient production. (Holcombe, 1991) 
If there is no market and, therefore, no competition among 
contractors to provide a service to the government, much of 
the gains of competition will not be passed on to the 
government by contractors. The costs most definitely will be 
passed on. There is little advantage in contracting out to a 
monopolist, other things equal. 
5.  Take Precautions Against Contractor 
Corruption 
In the private sector, a business may outsource when it 
is not cost effective to produce the good or service in 
house. This will hinge on the technology of production, the 
efficiency of its organizational structure, and the degree of 
market competition. Each of these items is variable. 
Therefore, the outsourcing decision must be under continual 
review. 
Although it is difficult and costly to reclaim an 
outsourced function, it is not impossible to do so. The Navy 
must be aware of that option should any of the above 
mentioned variables change. The Navy must be flexible and 
not merely accept the status quo merely because the task has 
traditionally been accomplished in a particular manner. 
A thorough investigation of a contractors may assist the 
Navy in coming to a decision on which contractor to engage to 
increase the probability of success. In the awarding of 
contracts, bidder past performance on defense contracts 
should be taken into account more fully. Company past 
performance record may be an important indication of the 
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quality of its subsequent work. Focusing on past 
accomplishments provides an incentive for improvement in 
these difficult fiscal times. 
The Navy must synchronize goals with the contracting 
firm, and the primacy of Navy goals must be established. 
Less than optimal results will be extracted if all concerned 
are not united in purpose (Hyman, 1993). 
Additionally, the government needs reliable feedback 
from contractors that is not filtered and distorted. No 
contractor wants to get locked into a bargain that allows no 
maneuvering room in event of change. The same is true of 
government. Government officials also desire flexibility in 
shaping goals with a contractor - the two parties must find a 
point of intersection to achieve optimal results (Kettl, 
1988). 
The costs of the contract process - design, monitoring, 
control, etc., must be calculated as accurately as possible 
to avoid excessive, surprise expenses. Inevitably there will 
be some unforeseen costs, but major corruption can be 
minimized with meticulous planning and dogged oversight. 
Extensive records should be kept on every outsourcing 
initiative. The DoD has done enough contracting out to have 
the necessary information compiled in a comprehensive 
database. Outsourcing activities can then have access to all 
pertinent data (who, what, where, when, why, how...) 
regarding the process of outsourcing from the solicitation of 
bids to contract renewals, including design, oversight, and 
control costs of each outsourcing endeavor. Access to 
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information regarding the experience of other military 
commands in outsourcing can prevent repetition of mistakes 
and provide a mechanism for making more accurate estimates of 
costs involved to assist in the prevention of cost overruns. 
C.   CONCLUSIONS 
Outsourcing has become a prescriptive to reduce the size 
of government and lower costs. Outsourcing does not 
necessarily provide cheaper or more efficient goods and 
services. Neither is outsourcing inherently better than 
performing services in house. The differences hinge on three 
key issues: setting standards and contractor goals, creating 
or using competition, and effective oversight (Kettl, 1988). 
Outsourcing of DoD services will neither reduce 
government outlays nor increase government efficiency unless 
decision to contract makes economic sense. Outsourcing may 
improve the short term budget picture, however, military 
authorities have an obligation to address long term issues. 
Outsourcing may be the appropriate tool to use at present, 
but unless it is used with discretion, the far reaching 
effects may be detrimental to national security interests in 
terms of force readiness. 
Outsourcing may be an effective tool for the Department 
of Defense with judicial use if the following points are 
considered: 
1. Sole bids from one contractor will not result 
in significant savings. Hidden monopolies 
will work against efficiency goals. 
2. There is a continuous need to monitor and regulate. 
The government will never be relieved of this 
responsibility. 
66 
3. There must be competition to realize savings. 
Multiple vendors must be available in most 
circumstances to achieve efficiencies. 
4. Monitoring costs can often outweigh the benefits of 
outsourcing. 
5. Costs of failure can be high. Outsourcing may fail 
due to lack of quality, bankruptcy of the 
contractor, or other factors. Government may have 
to take over, or bear the transition cost or loss 
of service entirely.  (Hanke, 1988) 
Regardless of the selection of in house or outsource, 
the government will be held accountable and responsible for 
the consequences of that decision and ultimately for economic 
growth and national security (Nuskey, 1992). Outsourcing is 
a healthy trend that can reduce incentive for waste and 
temper political pressures to continue inefficient government 
services. However, it is not a cure for all economic 
ailments of the Navy and DoD. The outsourcing initiative 
offers an opportunity to re-examine contracting out with an 
eye to raising productivity and paring costs. (Fitzgerald, 
1988) 
The Pentagon may not be a shining example of efficiency 
and reform but, compared to other government agencies, it 
does not do too badly (Technology Today, 1994). Some 
government operations can be efficiently outsourced, but 
others cannot. The current challenge to DoD and Navy 




COMNAVAIRPAC OUTSOURCED FUNCTIONS 
Management and Administration 
Hazardous Wastes Collection, Storage and Disposal 
Antenna Maintenance 
Custodial Services 
Grounds Structures Maintenance 
Pest Control 
Utilities Management 
Electrical Power Production 
Auxiliary and Portable Engine Generator Unit 
Electrical Distribution System 
Telephone System 
Steam and Domestic Hot Water Heating Systems 
Potable Water System 
Sewage Systems 
Communications, Computer and Radar Systems 
Transportation Operations and Maintenance 





Morale, Welfare and Recreation Services 
Engineering an Maintenance Control Services 




Fuels Management Operations 
Audiovisual Services 
Public Works Support Services 
Housing Maintenance 
Swimming Pool Maintenance 
Gas Distribution System 
Air Passenger Terminal and Air Cargo Service 
Tugboat Services 
Port and Harbor Services 
Maintenance and Repair of Aircraft 
Laundry and Dry Cleaning 
Automatic Data Processing Services 
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